Introduction
On October 8, 2016 the Saudi Arabian-led international coalition bombed a funeral in the capital of Yemen, killing at least 140 and injuring over 500 people.
3 At the time of writing, 4 See for instance: The Atlantic: Yemen's Wily Puppet Master, 2015.03. 5 The exact degree of Tehran's involvement in Yemeni affairs and its support of the Houthis is a subject of much debate. Saudi Arabia's involvement in its underdeveloped neighbor's domestic politics is, however, far from being a new phenomenon. 6 If one examines Yemen's history and regional power brokers shifting interests there, this feature becomes apparent. For instance, former president Saleh quickly realized that while playing out against each other various tribes might ensure his domestic political domination for a certain period, his legitimacy needed to be supplemented and cemented by regional backing as well. Alliance formation and its dynamics are formation in times of structural changes, it becomes possible to gain a deeper understanding of societal changes and their medium and long-term security-related implications. A comparative study which simultaneously takes into account the ontological-security-seeking behavior of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the southern secessionist movement, the Yemeni transitional government and the Houthi rebels would be welcomed.
It is important to clarify that this study does not claim to present a comprehensive survey of the often more complex patterns of Yemeni domestic politics. Still, precisely assessing the Houthi rebels' evolution remains crucial in understanding the wider implications of the multidimensional security challenges Yemen faces, including intertribal conflicts, sectarianism, northern insurgency, southern succession movement and the presence of a strong al-Qaida franchise in the southern and eastern provinces (Clive, 2011: 903) .
Theoretical background: Ontological security and collective identity formation
The first step in order to understand the rise of the Houthis is to open up the so-called "black box" of states, which International Relations and particularly its classical and neorealist approaches have long excluded from their analysis. Ontological security, or "security as being" is originally an individual-level concept developed by R.D. Laing (1969) and Anthony Giddens (1991). According to the original sociological theory, individuals have a certain level of basic trust about their surrounding environment, thus they are able to assess the consequences of their actions, and by establishing routines they can cope with uncertainties. This predictability in the day-to-day activities 7 provides actors with a stable identity and ensures existential certainty, or in other words ontological security. Ontological insecurity on the other hand means that in times of rapid or fundamental changes individuals are not certain any more as to how to relate means to ends -thereby they will be overwhelmed by anxieties and their identity becomes unstable.
In order to overcome this challenge, individuals develop various balancing strategies such as formulating a new identity, or returning to a previously established one, even if it is harmful in the long run, in order to gain back ontological security.
therefore substantially different in this region from the classical neorealist model developed by Stephen Walt. 7 Predictability rests on routines. Routines therefore are the fundamental actions that anchor identity. For a more detailed overview of the relevance of routines in the security dilemma, see: Mitzen 2004 Mitzen , 2006a Mitzen , 2006b Recently, a growing body of literature emerged in the field of International
Relations, where scholars scaled up the theory to the level of communities (Kinnvall, 2004 ) and the state level (Mitzen, 2004 (Mitzen, , 2006a (Mitzen, , 2006b Steele, 2008b, etc.) in order to reinterpret conflict and peace dynamics by including various non-material factors. The theory of ontological security provides a productive lens for examining the complicated nexus between security and identity 8 , therefore it is different from the classical IR understanding of "security as survival". The underlying argument of these theories is that all political actors face the need to maintain a sense of biographical continuity in order to realize a sense of agency. Moreover, this sense of agency has to be "recognized in and through actors' relations with others" (Kinnvall, Mitzen, 2016:2) . As such reciprocity is a crucial variable during identity construction and maintenance. Certain scholars 9 argue, however, that contemporary IR literature reduces ontological security to matters of identity preservation. The present paper agrees with Browning and Joenniemi, who claims that ontological security is as much about stability as about adaptability. 10 As we will see later, one of the most important elements of the Houthi movement's success is their relatively high degree of adaptation in this respect, especially when we compare them to other, politically less successful actors, such as the southern secessionist movement.
Catherina Kinnvall (2004) argues that globalization made individuals and groups more ontologically insecure. Evidentially, not just globalization, but such structural changes as the Arab Spring can also give rise to existential uncertainty. During these tumultuous and transitional periods individuals seek to draw closer to any collective that is perceived as reducing existential anxiety, in order to reaffirm their self-identity. The feeling of "belonging" helps actors to rebuild their ontological security. Kinnvall argues further that "as individuals' ontological security increases, they attempt to securitize subjectivity, which means an intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual existence)" (Kinnvall, 2004:749) . It is relevant to emphasize that the subjectivitysecuritizing process always involves a "stranger-Other" differentiation. As we will see later, identifying the "Other", who can be also turned into an enemy, is a crucial factor in times of identity construction and reformulation. In order to fully grasp the subjectivity-securitizing process, the concepts of chosen traumas and chosen glories also need to be introduced. They are "the means through which subjectivity becomes securitized in relation to others" and these events "provide the linking objects for later generations to be rediscovered, reinterpreted, and reused" (Kinnvall, 2004:751 ).
Kinnvall's main observation is that nationalism and religion are both intimately linked to chosen traumas and chosen glories. They are "powerful identity-signifiers in times of uncertain structural conditions, with the implication that they are likely to become more persuasive rallying points than other identity-signifiers" (Kinnvall 2004:757) . The strength of nationalism and religion as powerful identity-signifiers lies in their ability "to convey unity, security, and inclusiveness in times of crisis" (Kinnvall 2004: 762) . As we will see, the Houthis managed to utilize both of these factors to achieve their political goals.
The Houthi's identity roots: Zaydism and the emergence of the Believing Youth movement
The Houthis can be categorized in multiple ways. They can be viewed as a grassroots political movement, a non-state actor aided by various external powers, a distinct religious minority, or even as an organized militia. In fact, the movement can assert all of these roles at the same time. In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the Houthis, we must acknowledge that these identities are not mutually exclusive, but exist simultaneously -often reinforcing each other. It is also relevant to emphasize that identity is not a constant state of being, but a continuous process of becoming.
11
Yemen is characterized by a unique dual-governance structure. Historically, the central government possessed only a limited degree of control over the country's peripheral provinces. Water scarcity, the lack of employment opportunities and harsh weather conditions are all factors that contributed to the semi-autonomous nature of the northern region. Here, the dominant social value system is the qabyla (tribalism), in which tribal networks and family relations dominate political and social linkages. In practice, tribal confederations 12 and their powerful leaders are responsible for providing conflict mediation, public services and other basic state functions. Therefore, the local population's loyalty is based on these socio-cultural microstructures rather than Western-11 The concept of "change" is at the heart of identity construction. In sum, we should not forget that collective identity is more "than the sum of the individuals involved" (Kinnvall 2004: 748 Zaydi territories due to its extensive "marketing strategies", such as the establishment of religious institutions, educational centers and massive social benefit systems. Riyadh's aim was to gradually transform the socio-cultural and religious landscape of northern Yemen and to alter the balance of power to Riyadh's favor. In terms of ontological security, the Wahhabi infiltration was an externally supported identity-challenger which caused further existential anxiety within the Zaydi community.
In this context religion, as an identity-signifier, played a central role in the Houthis' identity construction, simply because the movement's original members were dominantly coming from the Zaydi sect. By the demise of the Imamate, the Houthis found their first "Other," as they were able to securitize subjectivity in opposition to the influence, it meant that they simultaneously began to politicize the Zaydi cause (Freeman 2009 (Freeman : 1008 , which had long-term consequences regarding the identity transformation process.
From politicization to securitization: The Believing Youth and the Houthi movements
Yemen became a unified country 16 
From the Yemeni Spring to Operation Decisive Strom
The latest milestone in the Houthis' identity transformation took place during the region- The mere fact that Saleh's rule ended can be considered as a fundamental change.
It brought a security and political vacuum in which previously stable identities and roles were challenged. This window of opportunity was most successfully utilized by the Houthis who were able to portray themselves as principal defenders of the entire Yemeni society. After months of protracted protests and negotiations, Saleh had to resign in exchange for immunity for him and his relatives. Additionally, he was allowed to remain in the country and to continue to be the first man of his party, the GPC (General People's Congress). The ultimate goal of the deal was to place former Vice President Hadi in power, who won the 2012 elections with more than 99 per cent of votes (as the only candidate).
As Saleh could remain in the country, he was able to utilize his extensive patronage network to sabotage the transition and eventually support the Houthis' advance.
20 During these six years an estimated 150,000 people were displaced, and thousands died in the conflict (Salmoni, Loidolt, Wells 2010:10) . 21 It the wake of the uprising, AQAP-associated militias capitalized on the emerging security vacuum and seized territory in the southern part of Yemen. Soon after this, the United Nations, Saudi Arabia and other members of the international community brokered a political compromise in order to halt the region-wide escalation of the conflict.
Policy-planning failures, such as the lack of inclusivity made the GCC initiative a failure in the long-run. The main shortcoming of the deal was that it marginalized those actors who initiated the Yemeni Spring.
22
Throughout 2013, with the support of the international community, the new political establishment initiated the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) which was aimed at reaching national consensus on a new political system for Yemen. The most important recommendation of the NDC was to reform the federal structure of Yemen by establishing six regions instead of twenty-six. This proposal however was rejected by both the Houthis and the southern secessionist movement.
23
At the same time, one of the nine major issues that was addressed at the NDC was how to alleviate the grievances of the Houthis. This explicitly meant that the Houthi movement was acknowledged as a political force in the Yemeni political arena. The core problem however remained in place, i.e. in practice the Houthis were excluded from the Hadi-led transitional government.
They could thus claim that the newly-elected government is just the continuation of the Saleh administration, incompetent and paralyzed by internal divisions.
Subsequently, in 2014, when the government wanted to remove fuel subsidies, as part of its economic reforms, the Houthis called for mass protest and launched a military offensive against the various tribal allies of President Hadi.
In September, different pro-Saleh forces joined their resistance and together they were able to take over the capital. This move meant that the Houthis were able to considerably expand their area of control from their traditional northern stronghold.
Moreover, as dissatisfaction with the Hadi government constantly grew, the Houthis were able to recruit new members at this time not only from among Shiites, but from among Sunnis also (Wells et.al, 2010) . This broadened, and eventually more heterogeneous, membership meant that the Houthis had to shift their self-narrative from religion towards nationalism as a rallying point. The Houthis successfully popularized their cause. They were able to capitalize on the widespread resentment against the transitional government, and they were able to utilize Saleh's support. 22 The protestors were led by students under the name of the "Union of Movement for Independent Youth". 23 "The Houthi rejection of the six-federation plan was mostly because their Sa'ada governorate was included in the proposed Azal region, which included Amran, Sana'a and Dhamar (all were under Houthi control by the end of 2014) but did not provide them with access to the sea or to a share of Yemen's oil and gas resources" (Brehony 2015: 243) .
Regarding their capability to adapt this is noteworthy: the Houthis were thus able to establish an effective working relationship with their former adversary, i.e. Saleh. The
Houthi-Saleh alliance began as mere coordination between the two parties, but in the wake of the Saudi-led intervention, it evolved into an effective, formal political cooperation. This alliance is clearly beneficial for the Houthis, who continuously take advantage of Saleh's extensive patronage network and political influence. 24 From the Houthis' perspective, however, this shift means that they managed to build up a pragmatic political agenda and they regard Saleh as an important actor who can considerably contribute to their power aspirations. , 2016: 4) . 25 Beside psychological aspects, it is crucial to highlight that from a military tactical point of view the mountainous terrain in Yemen is familiar to the Zaydi tribesmen. Government forces relied on artillery and airpower. This knowledge enabled the movement to expand its modus operandi from small-scale guerilla attacks effective in the mountainous terrain, to urban terrorism -and to thus strengthen their offensive capabilities (Freeman 2009 (Freeman : 1013 
Conclusion
After more than a year of military conflict, no side is getting closer to either a political solution or a decisive military victory. Hardly any observer had anticipated that what first was a localized religious group, with a narrow constituency among the youth in the north, would eventually became an organized insurgency, and later a de facto power-broker in Yemen.
As noted above, the Houthis successfully politicized and then securitized their cause. They were able to do that through various collective identity construction techniques during times of decisive, structural political changes.
It is also worth to note that Yemen's multipolar and fragmented political landscape is nothing new. The lack of "Yemeni" identity and the often malfunctioning central government enabled local tribal leaders and various powerful groups to maintain a political order based on customary law in several provinces. The simultaneous radicalization and polarization of the country however is a relatively new development. 28 Many of the airstrikes have been unlawful, where the coalition bombed residential neighborhoods, markets and educational facilities, thereby further worsening the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen.
These changes opened a new window of opportunity for the Houthis, who were able to capitalize on the emerging and gradually widening security vacuum.
The present paper's primary interest was to identify those structural variables that were responsible for the transformation of the Houthi movement from a cultural religious movement to a political-military force. It argued that the relatively high degree of adaptation to changing circumstances and the successful utilization of (first) religion and (later) nationalism as rallying points substantially contributed to the Houthis advancement. By taking into account other, non-material factors during an intra-state conflict, it is thus possible to discover that "security as survival" is more than just ensuring a military victory. "Security as being" can also have decisive impact on achieving the long-term political goals.
